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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Plaintiff Backpage.com, LLC 
(“Backpage.com”) requests immediate injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of a new 
law, Senate Bill 6251 (“SB 6251”), which will otherwise take effect June 7, 2012, and may 
be immediately used to allege unconstitutional felony criminal charges against Plaintiff and 
other online service providers.  Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court issue a 
temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction after any further briefing 
and hearing as the Court directs.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Starting June 7, 2012, all manner of online service providers nationally will be at risk 
of felony prosecution under a new Washington state law.  Although legislators named the 
offense “advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor,” SB 6251 in purpose and effect 
seeks to eliminate adult-oriented Internet advertising.  The law unconstitutionally poses a 
threat of strict criminal liability not only to classified ad websites (such as Backpage.com 
and craigslist), but also to any site that allows third parties to post content including images.  
The law encompasses social networking sites, dating sites, information sites, discussion 
forums, blogs, chat rooms, and sites that allow user comments and reviews – as well as to 
all online service providers involved in the chain of disseminating or displaying the content 
– i.e., search engines, internet service providers (“ISPs”), and more.  In other words, merely 
serving as a conduit for certain content can give rise to felony liability under SB 6251.  
SB 6251 makes it a felony to knowingly publish, disseminate, or display or to 
“directly or indirectly” cause content to be published, disseminated or displayed if it 
contains a “depiction of a minor” and any “explicit or implicit offer” of sex for “something 
of value.”  It is not a defense that a defendant did not know the age of the person depicted, 
and a defendant may not rely on representations by or the apparent age of the person 
depicted.  Instead, the law allows online service providers only one defense – that they 
obtained and retained certain government or school identification for the person depicted. 
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SB 6251 is antithetical to free speech and requires online service providers to act as 
the government’s censors of the Internet.  The law violates the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, as well as the First and Fifth Amendments and 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  This Court should immediately and permanently 
enjoin its enforcement for at least four reasons.  
First, SB 6251 violates section 230 of the CDA.  Explicitly designed to foster free 
and robust speech on the Internet, section 230 prohibits treating an online service provider 
“as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider,” and forbids imposition of liability under any inconsistent state law.  47 U.S.C. 
§§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  This broad immunity bars state liability for websites and other online 
services stemming from third-party content, as courts across the country have uniformly 
held.  SB 6251 violates section 230 because it forces online service providers to choose 
between censoring third-party content and risking felony criminal penalties. 
Second, SB 6251’s imposition of strict criminal liability on speech violates the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has 
long held that the State may not impose criminal liability on distributors of expressive 
materials without proof of scienter because of the severe chilling effect that otherwise would 
result.  More specifically, a defendant may not be criminally liable for distributing materials 
containing depictions of minors absent proof of the defendant’s knowledge that the persons 
depicted are minors.   
Third, SB 6251 also contravenes the First Amendment because it is vastly 
overbroad and not the least restrictive means of achieving the legislature’s goals.  The law 
is overbroad both because of the countless parties within its ambit and subject to criminal 
liability (websites, social media providers, search engines, ISPs and others) and because of 
the scope of third-party content that is affected and chilled (essentially all such content, and 
even private messages and emails), which is fully protected speech.  SB 6251 criminalizes 
posts that contain any “implicit” offer of sex for “something of value,” a standard so vague 
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that no person of ordinary intelligence can determine what conduct is criminal.  The law’s 
requirement that websites obtain and retain identification will deter adults from engaging in 
protected speech.  Even assuming the State’s aim was to prevent commercial sexual 
exploitation of minors, SB 6251 is far from the least restrictive means to do so.   
Finally, SB 6251 violates the Commerce Clause because the statute seeks to 
regulate conduct outside of Washington.  It is not the states’ role to regulate interstate 
commerce, particularly on the Internet, as Congress reinforced by enacting section 230, to 
prevent a hodge-podge of different and inconsistent state laws from the occurrence of one 
interstate act.   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The State Attorneys General Crusade Against Adult-Oriented 
Advertising on the Internet. 
In 2008, a collection of state attorneys general (“AGs”) began a crusade against 
online adult-oriented advertising.  Their initial focus was the well-known classified ad 
website craigslist.  Eventually, the AGs (forty-two, including Defendant McKenna) 
publicly issued a joint statement, which included several measures to detect and prevent ads 
for illegal services in the “erotic services” section of the website.  See Declaration of 
Ambika K. Doran, ¶ 3, Ex. B.  craigslist later took additional voluntary measures, including 
replacing the “erotic services” category with an “adult services” category.  Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. C.  
Nonetheless, a subgroup of seventeen AGs demanded that craigslist remove its adult 
services section entirely.  McKenna did not join this effort because, as a spokesperson for 
his office stated, it could cause users to post the same ads elsewhere on the site, making it 
more difficult for law enforcement to police.  Id. Ex. D.   
craigslist eliminated its adult services category in September 2010, briefly replacing 
the category with the word “censored.”  Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. E.  Almost immediately, adult ads 
migrated to other categories and websites, including Backpage.com.  Id.  Backpage.com, 
like craigslist, operates an online classified advertising service available nationwide.  
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Declaration of Carl Ferrer ¶ 2.  It hosts millions of user posts each month in a multitude of 
categories (e.g., local places, community, buy/sell/trade, automotive, musician, rentals, real 
estate, jobs, forums, dating, adult and services) and subcategories.  Id. ¶ 5 & Ex. A. 
Less than a week after craigslist eliminated its adult services category, the same 
subgroup of AGs wrote to Backpage.com insisting that it “like craigslist [should] shut[] 
down the adult services section of its website.”  Doran Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. F.  Backpage.com 
did not.  When McKenna became president of the National Association of Attorneys 
General (“NAAG”), NAAG sent and publicly released a letter to Backpage.com that leveled 
derogatory accusations at the company and requested extensive information “in lieu of a 
subpoena.”  Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. G.  At the time, McKenna admitted the AGs “have little legal 
standing to forcibly shut down the site” and the “broad immunity” provided to websites by 
the CDA for third-party content is a “high barrier.” Id. ¶ 9 & Ex. H.  Nonetheless, he 
insisted that Backpage.com “take down adult services advertisements altogether and take 
aggressive steps to be sure such ads don’t surface elsewhere on the site.”  Id.   
Backpage.com has attempted to cooperate with the AGs but has resisted the demand 
to eliminate an adult advertising category, maintaining that censorship is not the solution to 
problems of human trafficking and child exploitation, but rather that technology and 
responsible businesses – like Backpage.com – can contribute to combating these problems. 
To this end, Backpage.com has worked to prevent misuse of its website, making 
clear that users may not offer illegal services, and particularly emphasizing that content 
relating to child exploitation is prohibited.  See, e.g., Ferrer Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. B (Terms of 
Use, forbidding any postings relating to “exchanging sexual favors for money or other 
valuable consideration,” and “any material . . . that exploits minors in any way”); Ex. C 
(Posting Rules providing: “Any post exploiting a minor in any way will be subject to 
criminal prosecution and will be reported to the Cybertipline for law enforcement.” 
(emphasis in original)).  Users seeking to post or view material in the adult category must 
verify that they are at least 18 years old.  Id. ¶ 10.  The site cautions users to report any post 
Case 2:12-cv-00954   Document 2    Filed 06/04/12   Page 12 of 33
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING  
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION — 5 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 
LAW OFFICES 
Suite 22001201 Third AvenueSeattle, WA  98101-3045  
206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax 
that may relate to suspected exploitation of minors or human trafficking and contains links 
to websites of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the National 
Human Trafficking Resource Center.  Id. ¶ 10 & Exs. D & E.  
Backpage.com also takes extensive voluntary measures to police user content.  It 
employs a three-tiered system that includes automated filtering of nearly all ads and two 
levels of manual review by more than 100 workers.  Id. ¶ 13.  The automated process filters 
over 26,000 terms, phrases, codes, email addresses, URLs and IP addresses.  Id.  Through 
its review, Backpage.com blocks over a million posts every month.  Id. ¶ 14. Backpage.com 
refers any ads that may indicate child exploitation to the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, and referred more than 400 ads in April 2012 alone.  Id.  Backpage.com 
also cooperates with law enforcement, including by responding to subpoenas (usually within 
24 hours), and using other technological tools to voluntarily collect and submit additional 
evidence from across the Internet to help with investigations and prosecutions.  Id. ¶ 15.   
B. The Washington Legislature Passes SB 6251. 
Working with AG McKenna’s office, Senator Jeanne Kohl-Welles introduced SB 
6251 in the Washington State Senate on January 16, 2012.  Doran Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. I.  After 
several revisions, the Senate and House of Representatives approved the bill on February 8 
and 27, 2012, respectively.  Governor Gregoire signed the bill into law on March 29, 2012.  
Absent relief from this Court, it will take effect June 7, 2012.   
The substantive provisions of the final version of the law are as follows: 
(1) A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse 
of a minor if he or she knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or 
causes directly or indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed, any 
advertisement for a commercial sex act, which is to take place in the state of 
Washington and that includes the depiction of a minor. 
(a) “Advertisement for a commercial sex act” means any 
advertisement or offer in electronic or print media, which includes 
either an explicit or implicit offer for a commercial sex act to occur in 
Washington. 
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(b) “Commercial sex act” means any act of sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse, both as defined in chapter 9A.44 RCW, for which 
something of value is given or received by any person. 
(c) “Depiction” as used in this section means any photograph or 
visual or printed matter as defined in RCW 9.68A.011 (2) and (3). 
(2) In a prosecution under this statute, it is not a defense that the 
defendant did not know the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement.  It 
is a defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain 
the true age of the minor depicted in the advertisement by requiring, prior to 
publication, dissemination, or display of the advertisement, production of a 
driver’s license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or 
educational identification card or paper of the minor depicted in the 
advertisement and did not rely solely on oral or written representations of the 
minor’s age, or the apparent age of the minor as depicted.  In order to invoke 
the defense, the defendant must produce for inspection by law enforcement a 
record of the identification used to verify the age of the person depicted in the 
advertisement. 
See id. Ex. M. 
Significantly, by its terms, the law does not require any scienter.  It does indicate 
that one who “knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays” violates the law, but in the 
very next clause it imposes liability on persons who merely “cause[] directly or indirectly” 
content “to be published, disseminated, or displayed,” i.e., those who do so unknowingly.  
The offending content is not confined to advertisements for child sex trafficking, but 
includes postings of any kind that depict a minor and contain an “implicit” offer for sex in 
exchange for “something of value.”0F1  The statute does not define “implicit” or “something 
of value.”  There is no requirement that any sex act ever take place,1F2 meaning it is a felony 
to engage in the prohibited speech by itself.  And a party can escape liability only by 
obtaining and retaining certain forms of  identification, even if it is otherwise able to verify 
the age of the person depicted in the post. 
                                                 
1 This language was broadened significantly in the drafting process.  Compare id., Exs. K & L 
(definitions of “advertisement” in original version and first substitute of SB 6251).   
2 A prior draft did require that a crime of commercial sexual abuse of a minor or prostitution 
actually have occurred as a result of the ad.  Id. ¶ 13 & Ex. L (substitute SB 6251). 
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During hearings and in public statements, senators expressly recognized that SB 
6251 was vulnerable to challenge.  Id. Ex. N, at 13, 16, 17, 29, 30 (1/27/12 senate hearing).  
As Senator Kohl-Welles put it, “We kept asking, what does constitute a violation of 
freedom of speech. . ., what does constitute a violation of the federal Communications 
Decency Act?”  Id. Ex. J.  Ultimately, “we came up with the best language we could,” id., 
but “I suppose there could be a case made that, ‘Well, they’re chilling our free speech,’” id. 
Ex. O.  Moreover, after the legislature passed SB 6251, McKenna reiterated his call for 
Congress to amend the CDA, so that states are not “hampered in their ability to take 
enforcement action” against websites and other online services.  Id. Ex. P.  
C. SB 6251 Will Affect Thousands of Websites and Online Services. 
Legislators also made clear the law was aimed at Backpage.com.  Id. ¶ 15 & Ex. N, 
at 4, 7-8, 12, 13-14, 15 (1/27/12 hearing) Ex. O (Sen. Kohl-Welles:  “I would love to have 
the escort services section [of Backpage.com] shut down completely . . .”).  However, SB 
will in effect apply to many thousands of online services that host or transmit third-party 
content.  Beyond classifieds, these include social networking sites, such as Facebook, 
MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube; dating sites, such as Match.com and Passion.com; 
information sites, discussion forums, blogs, chat rooms, and sites that allow user comments 
and reviews, such as Wikipedia and CitySearch; search engines, such as Google, Bing, and 
Yahoo!; and internet service providers, such as AOL, Comcast, and CenturyLink. 
In fact, a recent analysis reported that escort ads continue to appear on craigslist and 
increasingly on other sites such as Facebook and About.com.  Id. Ex. S.  And a study 
conducted in New York City found that 61% of sex workers used craigslist, while 83% had 
Facebook pages.  Id. Ex. Q; see also Ex. R.  As one commentator put it, “Keeping these ads 
from popping up online is like trying to keep frogs in a bucket.”  Id. Ex. S.    
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. 
The standards for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction are “substantially identical.”  Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 
240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).  A plaintiff must show that (1) he is likely to succeed 
on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; 
(3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.  
Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  “[I]n the First Amendment context, the moving 
party bears the initial burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment rights 
have been infringed, or are threatened with infringement, at which point the burden shifts to 
the government to justify the restriction.”  Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 
1115-16 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Here, Backpage.com is likely to succeed on its claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 
SB 6251 violates the CDA and is unconstitutional.  Defendants (referred to collectively 
here as “the State”) cannot justify the chilling effect on speech that SB 6251 will cause.  
Irreparable harm – to Backpage.com, countless other online services, and the public – may 
be presumed, and in any event, is obvious.  Moreover, the public interest strongly favors 
granting injunctive relief to prevent even a temporary loss of free speech rights.   
B. Backpage.com is Highly Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Its Claims. 
1. SB 6251 Violates and Is Preempted by Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act. 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act unequivocally bars state law 
liability for interactive computer services premised on third-party content.  Because this is 
precisely what SB 6251 seeks to do, the law contravenes section 230 and is preempted. 
Three provisions of section 230 are significant here.  First and most importantly, 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1).  Second, “no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
Case 2:12-cv-00954   Document 2    Filed 06/04/12   Page 16 of 33
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING  
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION — 9 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 
LAW OFFICES 
Suite 22001201 Third AvenueSeattle, WA  98101-3045  
206.622.3150 main · 206.757.7700 fax 
inconsistent with” section 230.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added).  Finally, providers 
may not be held liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability” of material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).   
These provisions reflect Congress’s two fundamental goals.  “First, Congress wanted 
to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and 
to promote the development of e-commerce.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th 
Cir. 2003).  Second, Congress sought “to encourage interactive computer services and users 
of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material” by 
providing immunity for such voluntary efforts.  Id. at 1028; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a), 230(b).   
The Ninth Circuit and courts across the country recognize that section 230 grants 
broad immunity to online services for liability of any kind based on content provided by 
third parties.  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1129 (2003) (“§ 230(c) 
provides broad immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”); 
accord Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 
F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).  This broad immunity avoids the “obvious chilling effect” on 
free speech posed by the specter of liability based on third-party content.  Zeran v. Am 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Consistent with its broad scope, section 230 provides immunity for websites that 
post unlawful third-party ads, whether or not the provider knew or had any reason to know 
of the unlawfulness.  Thus, in Chicago Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held craigslist 
immune under section 230 for discriminatory ads posted on the site that would violate the 
Fair Housing Act.  The court concluded that craigslist was not obligated to and could not 
practically review all ads posted by users.  Under section 230, a plaintiff “cannot sue the 
messenger just because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful 
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[conduct].”  519 F.3d at 672; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 (holding AOL immune from 
for allegedly defamatory posts even after being notified and failing to remove them). 
Section 230 immunity also applies to state criminal laws.  Subsection (e)(3) provides 
that “no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added).  “The word ‘any’ has an expansive 
meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”  United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted).  In using a term of such breadth, 
Congress should be understood to mean what it said.  See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 
U.S. 848, 856 (2009); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2008).  Thus, 
section 230 grants interactive computer services immunity under any state law of whatever 
kind, including criminal laws.  People v. Gourlay, 2009 WL 529216, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Mar. 3, 2009) (“the phrase ‘any State or local law’ includes civil and criminal laws”). 
Section 230 provides an exemption for “federal criminal statutes,” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(1), (b)(5), but no similar exemption for state criminal laws.  It exempts from 
immunity “intellectual property laws” generally, as well as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act “or any similar state law.”  Id. § 230(e)(2)(4).  Congress knew how to exempt 
state laws – and did so – when that was its intent.  “[T]he plain language of the CDA 
provides internet service providers immunity from inconsistent state criminal laws.”  
Voicenet Commun’cns, Inc. v. Corbett, 2006 WL 2506318, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006).2F3   
To find a provider immune under section 230 “(1) the defendant must be a provider 
or user of an ‘interactive computer service;’ (2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant 
as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the challenged communication must be 
‘information provided by another information content provider.’”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1037.  
                                                 
3 Similarly, courts have rejected civil claims based upon alleged violations of criminal law.  See 
M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2011) 
(Backpage.com immune from claims of allegedly facilitating child prostitution); Dart v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967-69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (same as to craigslist); see also Doe II v. 
MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 570, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 148 (2009) (dismissing negligence 
claim arising from assault by men who met teenagers on networking site).   
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Backpage.com meets all three elements, as do thousands of other websites, search engines, 
and ISPs subject to SB 6251. 
First, websites are the quintessential and most common interactive computer services 
under section 230.  Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Courts have held that Backpage.com and similar websites meet 
the statutory definition.  M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (Backpage.com); Chicago Lawyers’ 
Comm., 519 F.3d at 672 (craigslist); Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (craigslist).   
Second, the ads and other postings targeted by SB 6251 are created by third parties, 
for which websites like Backpage.com are mere conduits.  See Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 
519 F.3d at 671 (a website “‘causes’ postings only in the sense of providing a place where 
people can post”).  See also M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 (rejecting arguments that search 
functions and ad revenue optimization methods made Backpage.com a content provider).   
Third, by making it a felony to cause any publication, dissemination, or display of 
third-party content, SB 6251 treats websites like Backpage.com as the publishers of that 
information.  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“what 
matters is not the name of the cause of action . . . [but] whether [it] inherently requires the 
court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another”).  
SB 6251 impermissibly holds all online service providers  “liable for [their] exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial function – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.   
SB 6251 represents a fundamental misunderstanding of section 230 and the openness 
of the Internet that Congress sought to protect and foster.  In passing SB 6251, legislators 
acknowledged they were trying to find a way to force websites to require users to provide 
identification for age verification, suggesting this would be no different than a newspaper 
requiring classified advertisers to present identification at the newspaper’s office.  See Doran 
Decl., Ex. N, at 4.  Yet, Internet businesses are very different from brick-and-mortar ones.  
The Internet is international in scope.  Online service providers do not have physical offices 
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in every location in which their service is available; since many services are global, this 
would be impossible.  Many online services in the “direct or indirect” chain of disseminating 
third-party content subject to SB 6251 (e.g., search engines, websites that link to other sites, 
ISPs) will never have contact with the content providers and have no way to identify or 
obtain identification from them.  Requiring individuals to provide identification for each 
posting would be so burdensome, expensive and impractical or impossible that websites in 
all likelihood will preclude all postings that come close to the proscriptions of SB 6251.   
Even assuming some website was willing to undertake the burden and risk of the law 
by mandating identification, likely most individuals would be dissuaded from posting 
content, because of the burden or invasion of their privacy.  And, if the State can require 
identification for postings implicitly referring to sex for “something of value,” can it do the 
same for all Internet postings in which individuals seek sexual encounters or businesses seek 
to sell sex-related products or services (e.g., Ebay’s “Adult Only” category)?   
SB 6251 reflects a disregard for the realities of the Internet and the benefits it offers.  
Given the breadth of the law, its onerous requirements, and its severe penalties, online 
services in all likelihood will disallow content altogether, which means that SB 6251 would 
severely restrict speech on the Internet, exactly what Congress sought to avoid.   
2. SB 6251 Violates the First and Fifth Amendments Because It 
Creates a Strict Liability Crime. 
The Supreme Court has long held that under the First Amendment the State cannot 
impose criminal responsibility on a defendant for distributing expressive materials without 
any proof of scienter.  In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1960), the Supreme Court 
struck down a Los Angeles ordinance making it a crime for booksellers to possess obscene 
books.  The Court noted that mens rea is a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American criminal 
jurisprudence, and the power to create strict liability criminal offenses is limited, especially 
in the First Amendment context.  Id. at 150.  Even though the First Amendment does not 
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protect obscene speech, the Court concluded that a bookseller could not be held criminally 
liable without proof of scienter concerning the contents of a book: 
It has been well observed of a statute construed as dispensing with any 
requirement of scienter that:  ‘Every bookseller would be placed under an 
obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop.  It 
would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to 
omniscience.’  And the bookseller’s burden would become the public’s burden. 
. . .  The bookseller’s limitation in the amount of reading material with which 
he could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute 
criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public’s access to forms of the 
printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly.  
Id. at 153-54 (footnote and internal citations omitted).   
The Court reiterated this principle in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), in 
which it upheld a New York law criminalizing distribution of sexually explicit depictions of 
minors in large part because the statute did require scienter.  Again, even though such 
materials were not entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court cautioned that 
“criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part 
of the defendant.”  Id. at 765 (citations omitted).   
Thereafter, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), the Court 
interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (prohibiting interstate transfer of child pornography).  The 
Ninth Circuit had held that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it did not 
contain any requirement that a defendant know that at least one performer in a production 
was under age 18.  United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th 
Cir. 1992).  The Supreme Court interpreted the law differently, holding that “the term 
‘knowingly’ in § 2252 extends to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the 
age of the performer”  because “a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to 
the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts.” Id.    
As the Ninth Circuit has said:  “Our reading of the relevant Supreme Court opinions, 
particularly Smith v. California, suggests that the first amendment does not permit the 
imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability where doing so would 
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seriously chill protected speech.”  United States v. United States District Court, 858 F.2d 
534, 540 (9th Cir. 1988).  Accord Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966) (“The 
Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of 
constitutionally protected material . . . .”); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 
F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Statutes that impose criminal responsibility for 
dissemination of unprotected speech must contain a knowledge requirement.”). 
SB 6251 directly violates this well-established law.  Under SB 6251, a prosecutor 
need not show that a defendant did anything “knowingly” so long as she can establish that 
the defendant “indirectly caused” dissemination or display of third-party content later 
shown to be unlawful.  The law does not require proof that a defendant knew (or even had 
reason to believe) that a person depicted in a posting was a minor – it provides expressly 
this is not a defense.  In short, if a third party posts content on the Internet containing a 
“depiction of a minor” and an “implicit offer” of sex for “something of value,” every online 
service connected in any way to the dissemination of that content is subject to criminal 
liability, whether the conduct was intentional or accidental, knowing or unknowing.  For 
example, Facebook could be prosecuted if one of the billions of profiles and posts by its 
users runs afoul of the law, merely because its platform was an “indirect cause” of the 
content’s dissemination.  Yet, as the Seventh Circuit observed in Chicago Lawyers’ 
Committee, 519 F.3d at 671-72:   
An interactive computer service “causes” postings only in the sense of 
providing a place where people can post. . . .  If craigslist “causes” the 
discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services (and, 
for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that owners 
use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell 
are liable for “causing” discriminatory advertisements. 
Under Smith, Ferber, and X-Citement Video, SB 6251 is unconstitutional because it 
would severely chill speech on the Internet in the same way the Supreme Court expressed 
concern about chilling booksellers and video stores in those cases. 
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Even setting aside First Amendment concerns, SB 6251 runs afoul of due process 
principles for strict liability statutes generally.  While “strict liability offenses are not 
unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements,” 
courts accord them a “disfavored status.”  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
437-38 (1978).  Such offenses are permissible only if (1) the penalty is slight; (2) a 
conviction does not result in substantial stigma; and (3) the statute regulates public welfare 
offenses applicable to inherently harmful or injurious items.  See Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Staples v. United States, 511 
U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994)).  SB 6251’s penalties of five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 
fine are certainly not slight.  See U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 442 n.8 (penalty of up to three 
years’ imprisonment and $100,000 fine too harsh to treat individual violations of the 
Sherman Act as strict liability crime).  A felony conviction undoubtedly results in stigma.  
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (felony is “as bad a word as you 
can give to a man or thing”).  Allowing individuals to post content on the Internet is not 
remotely close to the types of “public welfare” offenses the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged may be the subject of strict criminal liability.  See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 
607 (strict liability allowed for conduct involving “dangerous or deleterious devices or 
products or obnoxious waste materials,” citing hand grenades and narcotics as examples);  
X-Citement Video, 513 U.S at 71-72 (people “do not harbor settled expectations that the 
contents of magazines and film are generally subject to public regulation . . . First 
Amendment constraints presuppose the opposite view.”). 
Fundamentally, the legislature’s abandonment of scienter in SB 6251 contravenes 
the principle that a statute may not “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent 
conduct.”  Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426  (1985) (interpreting statute making 
unlawful the unauthorized acquisition of food stamps to include scienter element).  
Because that is exactly what SB 6251 does, it is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Shelton, 802 F. 
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Supp. 2d at 1305-06 (Florida statute dispensing with mens rea for drug possession offenses 
was facially unconstitutional). 
3. Senate Bill 6251 Is an Overbroad Content-Based Restriction That 
Violates the First Amendment. 
Content-based restrictions on speech “have the constant potential to be a repressive 
force in the lives and thoughts of a free people.  To guard against that threat, the 
Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid.”  
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).  To rebut this 
presumption, the government must show that the law passes strict scrutiny, i.e., “it must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest,” and “[i]f a less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.”  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).  “It is rare that a regulation 
restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 
2738 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818).  Because SB 6251 regulates speech based on 
content and is not narrowly tailored, it is constitutionally infirm. 
“A regulation is content-based if either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to 
suppress particular ideas, or if the regulation, by its very terms, singles out particular 
content for differential treatment.”  Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 
2009).  “[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law 
which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”  Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. 
City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994)).  A law is content-based if, to enforce it, “an official 
must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed.”  Id. at 794 (internal 
quotation omitted); accord Berger, 569 F.3d at 1051-52.   
SB 6251 imposes criminal liability based on the content of speech.  As noted, 
statements by legislators and McKenna show that the aim of SB 6251 was to eliminate 
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adult-oriented advertising on the Internet.  Moreover, even if motivated by a desire to 
combat sex trafficking of children, the law is plainly content-based because it cannot be 
enforced without reference to the content of a particular Internet post:  A law enforcement 
officer must determine whether the post contains an “implicit” offer for a sex act for 
“something of value” in Washington and appears to contain a depiction of a minor.  See 
S.O.C., Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir.), amended by 160 F.3d 541 
(9th Cir. 1998).   
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that SB 6251 restricts speech 
“no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to assure that legitimate 
speech is not chilled or punished.”  Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 512 U.S. at 666.  
The Constitution “gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within 
the First Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. 234, 244 (2002).  A law is “unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial 
amount of protected expression.”  Id.; accord Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).   
A law imposing criminal penalties on speech is “a stark example of speech 
suppression” and underscores the need for facial challenges.  Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. at 244.  With “severe penalties in force, few . . . speakers in any capacity, would risk 
distributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law.”  Id.  “The severity of 
criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even 
arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”  Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.  
844, 872 (1997).   
SB 6251 is vastly overbroad and far from narrowly tailored in numerous respects.  
First, the law is overbroad in terms of the parties it subjects to criminal liability.  Any party 
that “indirectly causes” offending content to be “published, disseminated, or displayed” is 
subject to imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.  Thus, for a single third-party post, prosecutors 
could charge the website where it first appeared; all search engines that identify the website 
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in response to user queries; any blogs, social networking sites, or individuals who link to 
the website; and even internet service providers that facilitate user access to the Internet.   
The law is also overbroad because of the enormous volume of Internet content it 
burdens.  As craigslist’s experience teaches, escort ads can appear in many categories 
within a classified ad website, even if an adult category is eliminated.  Personals ads fall 
within the ambit of the law, so that its burdens and risks also fall on dating and hookup 
websites (e.g., Hookup.com, Passion.com, Sugardaddy.com, and Adultfriendfinder.com, 
perhaps obviously, but also Match.com and eHarmony).  The law also encompasses profiles 
and posts on social networking sites (Facebook, MySpace, Twitter), and communications in 
chat rooms, forums, and individual emails or text messages.  In simple terms, any website 
or other online service that disseminates third-party content containing photographs of 
people and references to sex is at risk if it does not police and censor user postings.   
SB 6251’s definition an “advertisement for a commercial sex act” – as including any 
“implicit offer” of sex for “something of value” – is certainly not narrowly tailored and is 
impermissibly vague.  If a woman posts on a dating website describing her sexual interests 
and that she is looking for a “generous man,” would that constitute an “implicit offer” 
under the law?  If a masseuse offers customers “complete satisfaction” or an escort who 
intends nothing more than companionship promises “a night you’ll never forget,” would 
those be “implicit offers” contrary to the law?  For that matter, presumably all consensual 
sex reflects an exchange of “something of value” between the participants, even if no 
money changes hands.   
This central definition of the law is so vague it fails to give a “person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,” and “impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”  
Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 712 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also Reno, 
521 U.S. at 871-72 (vagueness of a law raises “special First Amendment concerns” when it 
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has an “obvious chilling effect on free speech,” and threatens criminal penalties and the risk 
of discriminatory enforcement).  The word “implicitly” is inherently vague, because it means 
“[n]ot directly expressed [and] existing [only] inferentially” and therefore “fails to clearly 
mark the boundary between what is permissible and impermissible.”  Vermont Right to Life 
Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (2d Cir. 2000) (invalidating state law on political 
ads that “implicitly” advocate success or defeat of candidate).   
SB 6251’s requirement that online services obtain and retain identification from 
users posting content – the only defense available under the law – is also vastly overbroad.  
As discussed above, the identification requirement is practically impossible and disregards 
the nature of the Internet.  Cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (noting that regulation of the 
Internet must take into account the nature of the medium).  Nonetheless, even assuming an 
online service could and would do this, millions of adults would have to present 
identification even if they simply want to date, provide companionship as an escort, offer 
massage services, or engage in a consensual sexual relationship.  Because adult-oriented 
speech is more sensitive and controversial, “many Web users [will be] simply unwilling to 
provide identification information.”  Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 
259 (3d Cir. 2003) (striking down age-verification requirement in affirmative defense to 
law criminalizing transmission of material harmful to minors). 
While SB 6251 is vastly overinclusive, at the same time it is underinclusive, which 
“raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it 
invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.”  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 
2740 (citation omitted); see id. at 2741-42 (government ends “must be pursued by means 
that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive”).  The law’s sole 
defense requires production of “a driver’s license, marriage license, birth certificate, or 
other governmental or educational identification card or paper.”  Yet, many of these 
documents do not have photographs and even those that do (such as a driver’s license) can 
be and routinely are forged.  By contrast, visual observation that a person is well over 18 or 
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a sworn affidavit or declaration (either of which would be competent evidence in this Court, 
see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1746) is insufficient to avoid liability.  Similarly, even if a person 
posting content provides identification, the depiction in the post could be of someone else 
or the photo or text may later change.  For that matter, posts that advertise “virgin,” “first 
time,” or “15-year-old” would not be restricted by the law.  And, SB 6251 is also vastly 
underinclusive because it can only reach persons and entities within the United States.  
Efforts to require censorship and impose criminal penalties such as SB 6251 will 
increasingly drive website providers offshore, given the international reach of the Internet.   
Not only is the sole defense allowed by SB 6251 a practical impossibility, it also 
“raises serious constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden 
of proving his speech is not unlawful.”  Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255.  “An 
affirmative defense applies only after prosecution has begun, and the speaker must himself 
prove, on pain of a felony conviction, that his conduct falls within the affirmative defense.”  
Id.  Thus, “where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the 
unlawful,” a speaker who “knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of 
the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”  
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).3F4   
Given the risks and severe penalties imposed by SB 6251, and the burden and 
impossibility of the sole defense, online services logically will preclude postings or block 
websites that could contain content remotely approaching the strictures of the law.  The 
practical effect of this effort to make websites and other online services censors of the 
Internet – on the pain of felony liability – will be to chill vast amounts of protected speech.    
                                                 
4 SB 6251 also cannot be sustained on the basis that “[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions are 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 297 (2008) (citations omitted).  This perhaps could be a defense of the statute if it did no more 
than impose criminal liability on content providers who knowingly post materials intending that 
they be interpreted as advertisements for commercial sexual exploitation of minors, similar to the 
child pornography law at issue in Williams (18 U.S.C. § 2252A).  SB 6251 goes well beyond this.   
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The breadth of SB 6251’s content-based restrictions imposes “an especially heavy 
burden on the Government” to explain why less restrictive means would not be as effective 
to accomplish the avowed purposes of the law.  Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.   
The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech.  Protected speech does not become unprotected merely 
because it resembles the latter.  The Constitution requires the reverse.  “[T]he 
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go 
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others 
may be muted . . . .” 
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted).  The State can offer no valid 
justification for SB 6251.  The customary method for deterring unlawful conduct is to 
impose an appropriate punishment on persons who engage in the conduct.  Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).  The State can (and has) enacted criminal laws to punish 
persons who have sex with and promote sex trafficking of minors.  See, e.g., RCW 
9.68A.040, .090, .100, RCW ch. 9A.44.  The State could impose criminal liability on 
persons who knowingly post online ads for sex trafficking of children, as the Connecticut 
General Assembly did after rejecting a bill similar to SB 6251.  Doran Decl., Ex. T.  Or, the 
State could investigate ways to use technology and the Internet to combat exploitation and 
trafficking in collaboration with Internet businesses, as the California AG has recently 
done.  Id. Ex. U.  The approach of SB 6251 – imposing censorship of the Internet or 
eliminating a substantial swath of lawful speech – is far from the least restrictive alternative 
available to the State.4 F5   
                                                 
5 The State may contend that SB 6251 should be interpreted under the standard of intermediate 
scrutiny applicable to commercial speech because SB 6251 on its face addresses “advertising.”  This 
would ignore the scope of the law, which as shown above, would burden vast amounts of non-
commercial speech.  When a statute seeks to regulate both commercial and non-commercial speech, 
it is subject to heightened scrutiny.  S.O.C., Inc., 152 F.3d at 1146-47.  Regardless, SB 6251 cannot 
satisfy the third and fourth elements of the intermediate scrutiny analysis set forth in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  As discussed 
above, SB 6251 does not directly advance the State’s ostensible purpose, and it restricts far more 
speech than necessary to achieve the State’s purpose.   
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4. SB 6251 Violates the Commerce Clause. 
Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  “[A] statute that directly controls 
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of 
the enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s 
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.”  Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 
324, 336 (1989).  “Because the [I]nternet does not recognize geographic boundaries, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities” without violating this 
rule.  Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (invalidating law 
prohibiting transfer to minors of sexually explicit materials harmful to minors).  Regulation 
of the Internet “highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, 
uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states.”  See PSINet, Inc. v. 
Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239-40 (4th Cir. 2004) (invalidating similar law). 
Applying these principles, nearly every federal court to have confronted individual 
states’ efforts to regulate the transmission of harmful material to minors via the Internet has 
found state restrictions unconstitutional.  See id.  See also ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 
1160-61 (10th Cir. 1999); Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 662 
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (invalidating law requiring ISPs to block access to sites containing child 
pornography); Se. Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 282 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (D.S.C. 2003); 
Cyberspace Commc’ns Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830-31 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Am. 
Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  State laws regulating the 
Internet control extraterritorial conduct in two ways.  First, “there is no guarantee that a 
message” from a resident of one state to another “will not travel through other states en 
route.”  Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1161.  Second, because individuals have no way of limiting 
their audience on the Internet, they too are subject to any restrictions created by any one 
state.  Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103.  Cf. State v. Heckel, 143 Wn.2d 824, 840, 
24 P.3d 404 (2001) (distinguishing Washington anti-spam law from other Internet laws 
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found unconstitutional because “the Act reaches only those deceptive … messages directed 
to a Washington resident or initiated from a computer located in Washington”). 
Under this authority, SB 6251 is invalid.  The statute applies to conduct anywhere, 
so long as an online service causes the display or dissemination of Internet content for 
conduct that may take place in Washington.  Postings by individuals in Oregon, Idaho, or 
British Columbia concerning sex that could take place in Washington would be subject to 
SB 6251.  A review on a travel website of an escort service in Seattle, linking to the site, 
would subject the poster and any online service that indirectly “caused” the publication of 
the review to the penalties of SB 6251.  Likewise, a message from a Washington resident 
sent to another Washington resident – but is transmitted through a server in a different state 
– falls within the law.  The Washington legislature has attempted to project its policy 
choices onto residents of other states, creating an undue burden on interstate commerce, and 
putting users at risk of inconsistent state regulation.  This is impermissible and a separate 
ground for invalidating SB 6251.5 F6 
C. Backpage.com, Other Online Services, and the Public Will Suffer 
Irreparable Harm If SB 6251 Is Not Enjoined. 
 “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); 
see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2003) (risk of 
irreparable injury may be presumed when plaintiffs state a colorable First Amendment 
claim).  Here, the Court can and should follow this constitutional presumption and find that 
Backpage.com, other online service providers, and the public as a whole will suffer 
irreparable harm if enforcement of SB 6251 is not enjoined.  Moreover, aside from the 
presumption, ample evidence supports such a finding.  If the State tries to enforce SB 6251, 
Backpage.com and thousands of other services will be faced with the intractable choice of 
                                                 
6 Even if the Court were to find the statute does not directly control out-of-state commerce, it is 
invalid because “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).   
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censoring third-party content to exclude anything potentially prohibited (a practical 
impossibility), or risk felony charges and penalties. 
D. Granting Injunctive Relief Is In the Public Interest. 
The Ninth Circuit has also “consistently recognized the ‘significant public interest in 
upholding free speech principles, as the ‘ongoing enforcement of the potentially 
unconstitutional regulations . . . would infringe not only the free expression interests of 
[plaintiffs], but also the interests of other people’ subjected to the same restrictions.”  Klein 
v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted).  As discussed above, SB 6251 would burden vast amounts of protected 
speech, and so the public interest also strongly favors granting injunctive relief. 
E. The Balance of the Equities Favors Granting Injunctive Relief. 
Finally, the balance of equities favors granting injunctive relief.  If SB 6251 takes 
effect, websites and other service providers will be forced to censor or block vast amounts 
of Internet content or may be put out of business altogether.  On the other hand, delaying 
enforcement of SB 6251 will not harm the State, which still has at its disposal numerous 
other laws it can use to combat sexual exploitation of children and human trafficking, 
without infringing fundamental rights under the Constitution and the CDA.6F7 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For now, the Court should enjoin enforcement of SB 6251 temporarily and 
preliminarily to prevent severe violation of federal statutory and Constitutional rights and to 
                                                 
7 Backpage urges that no bond should be required in support of the injunction.  “The district court 
may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to 
the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.”  Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th 
Cir. 2003).  Courts regularly dispense with the bond requirement in granting injunctions against 
state laws or policies based on constitutional challenges.  See, e.g., Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified 
Sch. Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ( “to require a bond would have a negative 
impact on plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as well as the constitutional rights of other members of 
the public”); Mercer, Fraser Co. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 2008 WL 4344523, *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 
2008) (no bond required where “the preliminary injunction will require defendant to incur little or 
no monetary costs and … the injunction is sought to vindicate constitutional rights and the public 
interest”); see also Higher Taste v. City of Tacoma, 755 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
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preserve the status quo of lawful free speech on the Internet until this action can be decided.  
Ultimately, the Court should enjoin the law permanently and in its entirety, because the law 
violates federal and Constitutional rights of Backpage.com, countless other online service 
providers, and the public. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012. 
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